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Abstract: Malaysia held the ninth Sarawak state election on May 20, 2006. It has 
invited various issues such as native customary rights land development, fuel hike and 
Chief Minister successor issue. Barisan Nasional won 62 of the 71 seats. The result was 
seen as a shock because BN failed to maintain the big mandate given from the previous 
election which was 60 of the 62 seats contested. The opposition meanwhile won 9 seats, 
reflecting new voting attitudes among the voters. This article examines the election 
issues and their performance in the election. This article also discusses the factors that 
influenced the voting patterns and the implications in the future. It is drawn from a 14 
days fieldwork since nomination day, throughout election campaign period and polling 
day in May 2006. 
Key words: Malaysia; State Elections; Voting Patterns; Election Issues; Electoral 
Results 
 
Résumé: La Malaisie a tenu la neuvième élection  dans l'État de Sarawak le 20 mai 2006. 
Cela a causé des problèmes divers, tels que les droits coutumiers de   l'aménagement des 
terre, l'augmentation des prix de carburant et les successeurs du ministre en chef. 
Barisan Nasional a remporté 62 des 71 sièges. Le résultat a été considéré comme un choc, 
car BN n'a pas réussi à maintenir le grand mandat de l'élection précédente, c'est-à-dire 
obtenir 60 des 62 sièges à pourvoir. Pendant ce temps, l'opposition a remporté 9 sièges, 
ce qui reflète les nouvelles attitudes de vote chez les électeurs. Cet article examine les 
problèmes électoraux et leur performance dans l'élection. Il explique également les 
facteurs qui ont influencé les habitudes de vote et les implications dans l'avenir. Il est tiré 
d'un travail de 14 jours sur le terrain depuis le jour de nomination, durant toute la période 
de campagne électorale et le jour du scrutin en mai 2006. 
Mots-clés: Malaisie; élections de l'État; habitudes de vote; problèmes électoraux; 
résultats électoraux 
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INTRODUCTION 
Malaysia’s political system framework is based on federal constitutional monarchy with the king as head of 
state and the Prime Minister is the head of government. Federal government has its legislative power vested 
in the Parliament and the 13 states under the state assemblies.  
Malaysia held the ninth Sarawak State Legislative Assembly (SLA) elections on May 20, 2006 after the 
date of nomination was confirmed for May 9, 2006. The Elections Committee (EC) also confirmed a 
duration of eleven days for the campaign taking into account the interest of 892,537 voters including 14,727 
voters via postal service as well as the geographical factor and the increase in the number of seats from 62 to 
71 in this state elections (New Straits Times, 25 April 2006). SLA was dissolved by the Governor (Yang 
di-Pertua Negeri) Sarawak, Tun Abang Muhammad Salahuddin Abang Barieng with the advice of the 
Chief Minister Tan Sri Abdul Taib Mahmud on April 24, 2006 to enable the selection process via casting of 
votes, one of the branches of democracy taking place in Sarawak. While the 1996 elections saw Barisan 
Nasional (BN) winning 57 out of the 62 seats which were being competed for, the 2001 elections witnessed 
BN controlling 61 out of the 62 seats with the remaining seat being held by the opposition party, 
Democratic Action Party (DAP) in the SLA constituency of Kidurong. Hence, this article will attempt to 
study the issues and achievements from this election and also study the performance of parties involved 
especially that of BN. 
 
2006 ELECTION ISSUES AND CAMPAIGN 
BN Sarawak was a combination of four component parties, them being Parti Pesaka Bumiputera Bersatu 
(PBB) headed by Taib Mahmud; Sarawak United People’s Party (SUPP) under the leadership of Tan Sri Dr 
George Chan; Sarawak Progressive Democratic Party (SPDP) led by Datuk Seri Dr James Jemut Masing, 
and Parti Rakyat Sarawak (PRS) chaired by Datuk William Mawan. All these parties under the BN banner 
compromised and agreed to stand for elections and each were allocated 35 seats (PBB), 19 seats (SUPP), 9 
seats (PRS) and 8 seats (SPDP). 
A large number of events took place before the elections began. Datuk Seri Najib Tun Razak, the then 
Deputy Prime Minister (DPM) had challenged BN Sarawak to prove their capability of achieving a 100 
percent victory in the upcoming elections. Several events then commenced including a visit by the then 
Prime Minister Datuk Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi to Taib Mahmud’s house and the assembly of the 
Government Supporters’ Club in Kuching. In actual fact, Taib was an extraordinary leader for the people of 
Sarawak. He was seen as an individual filled with vigour and high aspirations, highly experienced and 
capable of great achievements. Even though he had been leading them since March 1981, he still 
persevered and continued to be motivated in order to lead, what more with already succeeding in bringing 
reformation to Sarawak’s surroundings form the aspects of politics, social, economy and infrastructure 
regardless of his constantly being questioned especially criticized on the imbalance of the development 
based on ethnicity and district. Besides that, there were those of the opinion that he had already been too 
long in his leadership.  Although the crowd was not as great as in 1987, it still left an effect on Taib. In 1987, 
23 years younger from his age of 73 years today, a crisis labeled the uncle-nephew relationship crisis that is 
between Tun Rahman, the Yang DiPertua of Sarawak and Taib, occurred. Tun Rahman was seen criticizing 
Taib openly especially emphasizing on the relationship with the Federal government so much so that Taib 
had once left a function attended by both of them due to the open political war upon him by his uncle.   
The difference of leadership style can be assumed as the cause of the existence of such a political uproar 
(Jeniri Amir, 2006).  The effects of this argument also witnessed what was known as ‘The Ming Court event 
1987’ where 27 SLA members formed ‘Kumpulan Maju’ (Success Group) and declared their loss of faith 
and trust in Taib’s leadership. This clash also witnessed four Ministers and three Deputy Ministers 
submitting their resignations. Taib’s decision to dissolve the SLA enabled him to regain power until today 
(Ahmad Nidzamuddin Sulaiman, 1994).  
The Sarawak elections also brought about shocking speculation that there would be a new Chief 
Minister folowing the end of the Taib era. Sarawak had had Chief Ministers before Taib, them being Datuk 
Stehpen Kalong Ningkan, Tawi Sli, Tun Abdul Rahman Yaakob and now Taib himself. This occured 
ensuing the withdrawal of Dato’ Sri Adenan Satem from the cabinet reshuffle done by the Prime Minister at 
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federal level. His experience as a magistrate and public prosecutor made him respectable and he had once 
been the ’middle man’ in the internal political crises of Sarawak.  
Similarly with BN’s move which was seen as being in a comfort zone throughout the early part of this 
election campaign. BN only emphasised on the core importance of a cooperative relationship among all 
races and set aside any practices of the various groups. The oppostion’s strategy could also be seen as their 
attempt of competition in all 71 areas via the pact known as ’Barisan Bersatu Sarawak’ (Sarawak United 
Coalition) involving two opposition parties, Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR) and Sarawak National Party 
(SNAP). 
The opposition placed more emphasis on the issues of royalties and the hike of oil price as well as the 
lack of sugar supply during that point of time. The oil issue was the dominant issue as throughout the 
elections, the petroleum phenomena at the global level especially with the East Timor war still at its critical 
stage, was considered amongst the attracting factors which caused the hike in price. KeADILan (PKR) 
President, Datin Seri Dr Wan Azizah Wan Ismail in most of her speeches and orations touched on this issue 
as it was considered that Sarawak was paying more in its production of oil even though it was the supplier 
of the resource itself. In the opinion of BN, it was a dead-end issue as Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim, de facto 
adviser of the PKR party, had before rejected Sarawak’s plea when he held the position of Finance Minister 
then.  
The opposition also used issues on development mainly on the relocation of the people residing in the 
squatter areas as accused of having almost 7,000 squatter houses in Miri but this was against the policy 
implementor as BN discovered it had to be endorsed in stages in order to enable the residents to acquire 
low-cost houses in a certain point of time and duration.  
Besides that, the issue of development and land also became material for campaigns of the parties 
standing for elections. It was also fully utilised by the DAP who tried to instill the feeling of dissatisfaction 
by emphasizing the elements of 60 leases which should have ended in the year 2006. Many owners felt that 
they should have to pay 32-75% of the premium payment if they were to release their land especially in the 
municipal vicinity. As for the outskirts, the payment was expected to be approximately 25-35%. 
All of these issues became material for the elections campaign. Although it was such for the supporters 
and leaders of BN, the actions of a handful of opposition leaders was considered weird and surprising as 
there were areas which saw the opposition placing candidates and there were such candidates fromthe 
opposition who believed they did not stand a chance in winning the elections. Although there were those of 
the opinion that BN would have an easy victory at the early stages of the elections campaign, many among 
the ring of observers were expecting an extraordinary result at the end.  
 
ELECTORAL RESULTS  
Several factors influenced the results of the 2006 elections. The table below presents the tally of the 2006 
elections: 
Table 1:  Total Number of Seats Competed and Total Number of Seats Won 
 
Party Total Number of Seats Competed Total Number of Seats Won 
BN 71 62 
PKR 25 1 
SNAP 29 1 
DAP 12 6 
PAS 1 0 
Independent 16  1 
 BN won without competing seats N.50 Dalat and N.37 Daro 
Source: Mingguan Malaysia, 14 May 2006 and Sunday Star, 21 May 2006 
 
Although the results showed that BN had returned to power in Sarawak, the opposition had made a 
stunning surprise by winning nine seats from only having won two seats in the previous elections. BN 
regained its mandate by winning 62 out of the 71 seats competed but they received a great slap in the 
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duration of 19 years as if the event of 1987 had repeated itself whereby the opposition won 20 seats 
compared to BN with 28 seats.  
BN’s performance was tarnished with the loss of eight out of 19 seats competed by its component party 
SUPP while PRS lost one out of the nine seats being competed. This enabled the opposition to gain power 
in the area of Pending, Batu Lintang, Kota Sentosa, Bukit Assek, Kidurong, Meradong, Padungan, Engkilili 
and the independent candidate in Ngemah (Mingguan Malaysia, 2006).  
There were also several ‘hot seats’, for instance, the victory of PKR candidate Ng Kim Ho in N9 
Padungan over BN-SUPP candidate Lily Yong Lee Lee. Yong also seemed to place the blame on the 
central government on the cause of the rise in oil price, and at that time was unable to overshadow the DAP 
campaign which focused on issues relating to the town area mainly issues with the Municipal Council, 
renewal of land lease and several other business. In the N12, BN candidate Datuk Yap Chin Loi was 
defeated by DAP candidate Chong Chieng Jen who was considered had won based on the factor of votes by 
the Chinese voters. The same was seen in the N29 Batang Al constituency which mirrored the clash 
between two personalities, them being Dublin Unting Ingkot (BN-PRS) and Nicholas Bawin (SNAP) and 
ending with victory for the BN candidate, N40 constituency was also an attraction to many in witnessing 
the fight between two young candidates although there were also three other independent candidates. The 
outcome was victory to Ting Tze Fui (DAP) over Wong Zee Yeng (BN-SUPP). Taib (BN-PBB) however 
maintained his Balingian seat by defeating Ibrahim Bayau (PKR) (New Sunday Times, 2006). N.26 
constituency witnessed the fall of Datuk Seri Daniel Tajem (SNAP) who was standing in order to regain his 
seat which was instead passed on to Mong Dagang (BN-PRS) as Daniel Tajem had been in BN before his 
party was faced with internal problems. This was considered a popular seat as it was called the ‘hot seat’ 
among the Iban community.  
Several factors can be taken apart to give justification upon the victory of the opposition mainly DAP. 
Among them is BN’s attitude of being over-confident with their previous win. This was followed with BN’s 
posters hardly being seen in certain areas as well as only speeches and talks among the BN supporters were 
done on a small scale. The results on the night of May 20th proved that although voters still preferred BN to 
be in power, they also gave votes in protest in several areas which were won by the opposition. 
DAP had before won three seats in Pelawan, Kidurong and Bukit Assek during the 1996 elections and 
their then Chairman, Richard Wong Ho Leng had defeated the then President of SUPP, Tan Sri Wong Soon 
Kai. DAP’s success this time round was focused on areas where the majority was made up of Chinese 
voters. They won six seats compared to the one seat in the previous elections. This included the SLA area in 
Kuching, Sibu and Bintulu, that is Meradong, Bukit Assek, Pending, Kota Sentosa, and Engkilili and 
maintained the Kidurong seat. The opposition also decreased the majority BN candidates of about 200 – 
1,500 votes.   
Two important factors as stated above, them being issues pertaining to land and oil were the key points 
to BN’s defeat in several areas. For the land leasers, they assumed that they were required to pay a large 
amount as premium on the account that they wanted their land to be leased out again. Most of the Chinese 
voters were the owners of these lands. Although BN had repeatedly stated that the people’s land would not 
be taken or confiscated, the opposition candidate exploited the premium issue and utilized it as a stepping 
tone to win the confidence of the voters in several areas.   
A similar situation with the issue of the increase in the price of oil. The opposition was rather consistent 
in their campaign and caused a confusion by posing the question as to why the people of Sarawak were 
required to suffer due to the hike in oil price when in actual fact they were the biggest producer and suppler 
of oil and gas in the country. This was no doubt DAP’s game under their manifesto based on the concept 
‘Enough is Enough’ and ‘Sarawak Deserves Better’ whereby the government was expected to bear the 
responsibility by announcing their final decision on amending the Sarawak Land Act, thus allowing the 
lease of land to be renewed automatically on its own upon the expiry of the lease. The voters found it 
difficult to accept BN’s response as many of them needed to use oil and gas for their businesses and 
transportation. This issue trapped SUPP especially as the party was supposedly one that protected and 
upheld the rights and interests of the Chinese community in Sarawak. 
The voting pattern amongst the Chinese community was hard to ascertain. This was because in the 
precious elections, strong support was given to SUPP but this time their support veered towards DAP. 
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Several main candidates of SUPP such as Datuk Sim Kheng Hui dan Datuk Alfred Yap were defeated. This 
was an indirect message being sent to the leadership of SUPP informing them that the Chinese voters had to 
be given more attention and priority in their interests and not to create any form of development at anytime. 
SUPP also needed to take note of the opposition candidate’s ability to manipulate issues based on their 
backgrounds. The ’house to house’ campaign strategy and emphasis on small problems should be made an 
example. Candidates with ’red report cards’ especially those within the grade F (fail) politicians category 
needed to be dropped and substituted or replaced with a candidate who had a clean record and suitability 
with the surrounding local area. SUPP which was the representative of the Chinese community needed to 
perform a post-mortem on their bad performance in this elections, whatmore with the defeats of two 
candidates supposedly the successors of the President, Deputy Chief Minister George Chan, that is Tan Sri 
Dr Wong Soo Kai and Tan Sri Stephen Yong. 
The results of the Sarawak State elections also made a rather big impact at the central government level 
mainly the voting pole of the Chinese community. Similarly with the issues brought forward by the 
opposition as well as issues pertaining to the replacement of the leaders in the party. The relationship link 
through the marriage of George Chan’s daughter and Taib’s son could assist in healing and rejuvenating the 
motivation of SUPP in the near future. There was also rumours after the elections that PRS and SPDP 
would combine with each having won eight seats respectively, and thier collaboration would cause SUPP to 
have only eleven seats thus losing their popularity as the second strongest after PBB. Nevertheless the 
combination of both parties would never happen as each was faced with internal conflicts which would 
most certainly prolong. PBB still maintained its power by winning all the seats that they had stood for, and 
only the issue of the Chief Minister’s replacement becoming the party President still haunts them.   
This trend of voting needs to be fully analysed in detail as it could leave a rather big impact and effect on 
the upcoming general elections especially in the urban and city areas and it all depends on the readiness of 
SUPP and other BN component parties to face the old and current issues in order to avoid an outcome 
similar to that of the staet elections to reoccur in the general elections. The opposition will also form 
strategies which will continue to shake the position of the governing party regardless of being aware that the 
voting pole will not remain permanently the same way and that iys performance not necessarily static as 
seen in the 2006 elections. 
The 2006 performance and 1987 Ming Court Event act as if wanting to give an alternative voice in the 
SLA. The echoes and voices of the Chinese voters need to be taken into account and regarded as a signal to 
the party which is still prolonging their internal issues and give opportunity to look into the interest of these 
voters. The new generation possesses a different outlook and zest in the more condusive atmosphere of 
today. Their roles need to be acknowledged and given opportunity to look into their respective capabilities 
in order to gain the support of their generation.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Although many regard the results of this elections as a side-track from the performance of the 2001 
elections, however BN still continues to receive its mandate to administer and lead the state of Sarawak. 
Nevertheless, the large victory witnessed in the 2001 elections was not as noticeable in the elections this 
time. Voters were aware that they would not experience any development if they were to vote for the 
opposition but a new trend emerged to cast protest votes in order to form a balance in the political 
participation at the planning and implementing of policies of the state SLA. In actual fact, the next state 
elections which should be held very soon will become a large bet to see as to how far the Sarawak BN 
component parties will succeed in preventing the opposition or to continue becoming a liability to the 
overall image and performance of BN at the state government level before the nation’s General Elections 
speculated to be held in year 2012. 
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